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Our brief in this symposium is to look at “both the continuing significance
of some long-lived patterns in the scholarship of this field, and the impor-
tance of newer emergent trends and themes,” particularly in relation to “big
questions that scholars—not just historians—might ask about technology,
culture, and the world.” Bruce Seely further asked us for “insights about
where historians of technology and the Society should be directing their
scholarship and activities in the years ahead.” This is a tall and problematic
order: what exactly is the field we should be considering, since the study of
technology is clearly not confined to self-proclaimed historians of technol-
ogy? How can we even begin to give a picture of its accomplishments?
Indeed, ought we not distrust narratives that purport to tell us where the
historiography (and other studies) of technology has been, is, and is going?
Furthermore, should we not bear in mind that exhortations that fields are
shifting or ought to shift to one particular method, problem, or period
often repress rather than stimulate novelty, and reflect a narrowing of con-
versation and debate, perhaps inevitable in diverse fields, but no less regret-
table for that? In this essay I hope to avoid some of these problems by ask-
ing an even bigger prior question: what is the history of technology (in
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the 2004 SHOT Amsterdam meeting and at the 2008 Darmstadt meeting of the Deutsche
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many different guises, and in many different modes) the history of? What,
in practice, is meant by technology in histories, and what is meant by his-
tory in histories of technology? Our thinking about technology, and indeed
our thinking about the historiography of technology, is, I suggest, uncriti-
cally focused on some, but not all, novelties.
In the last generation, public policies in the United States, Europe, and
the rest of the rich world have placed enormous rhetorical emphasis on the
need for increased “innovation,”which has been reflected in increased insti-
tutional support for implicitly instrumentally useful social and historical
studies of technological change.1 In the historiography of technology too
there has been a strong focus on novelty, on radical breaks with the past.We
in the academy are supposed to have got past unreflexive progress-talk, and
are now (in theory, and in Theory) eclectic, playful with time, and open to
the marginal. But, in historiographical pronouncements that introduce and
summarize new work, a very old-fashioned and narrow progressivism is
prevalent.2 Authors invoke the specter of a darkly ignorant past, an enlight-
enment in “recent years” (embellished with a citation to a work decades
old), and a contemporary revolution. They attack paper tigers like “whig
history,” “technological determinism,” and “linear models” as if they were
made of scholarly living flesh and bone. For example, in 2003 technologi-
cal determinism could still be described as a “fast-dying horse,” when it was
surely either never alive, long dead, or, to labor the point, the slowest dying
horse in the annals of veterinary science.3 From its creation in the 1980s till
today, the “linear model” is attacked despite having been an object of attack
from its very creation. Such caricaturing of analysts of the past has led to
the caricaturing of what happened in the past, for example giving the im-
pression that the linear model was central to belief about and policy for sci-
ence and technology in recent times.4
In the academy, as in technology and in politics, novelty-mongering
does not necessarily reflect novelty, much less progress. During the 1980s
1. It is, however, a mistake to believe that this has been central to public policy (mar-
ket liberalization has been much more significant) or that innovation has in fact in-
creased.
2. As an example see Mark Poster, Cultural History + Postmodernity: Disciplinary
Readings and Challenges (New York, 1997). While this tone is evident in programmatic
statements, it is not generally noted that this reflects a profoundly modernist mode of
thought. An exception is Richard Evans in his In Defence of History (London, 1997),
201–2, where he cites William Reddy noting “postmodernism’s replication of the eter-
nally recurring pretension of absolute originality characteristic of intellectual debate
since the Enlightenment” (p. 278, n15).
3. Michael G. Gordin, “A Modernization of ‘Peerless Homogeneity’: The Creation of
Russian Smokeless Gunpowder,” Technology and Culture 44 (2003): 677.
4. See my “‘The Linear Model’ Did Not Exist—Reflections on the History and His-
toriography of Science and Research in Industry in the Twentieth Century,” in The Sci-
ence-Industry Nexus: History, Policy, Implications, ed. K. Grandin, N.Wormbs, and S.Wid-
malm (Sagamore Beach, Mass., 2004), 31–57.
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historians of technology were invited to embrace, as a supposed novelty,
applied sociology of scientific knowledge—although this meant applying to
science what was already known about technology/politics/history, as well as
embodying the view (explicitly rejected by many historians of technology)
that technology is applied science.5 While this approach (SCOT, in short-
hand) did open up new questions for some historians of technology, others
were already alert to alternatives, to paths not taken, to the reality that not
all change is progress, and to an understanding that the invocation of theory
is not in itself a sign of methodological or historiographical sophistication.6
Other approaches taken to be novel have been influential, even when they
embodied scholarly tendencies at best indifferent to the economic, the insti-
tutional, the social, and the material.7 “Material culture” was much more
cultural than material, as a browse through the “thing studies” literature will
quickly confirm.8 Studies of “consumption” have been in fashion, while in-
vestigation of “production” is shockingly démodé. In this context it does not
come as a surprise that the standard text on technological determinism of
recent years was mainly about beliefs in technological determinism (itself
generally defined as a belief, rather than a theory).9 Indeed, “cultural his-
tory” of technology has been in vogue, as evidenced by Mikael Hård and An-
drew Jamison’s book subtitled A Cultural History of Technology and Science10
and by Paul Forman’s recent reflection on the place of technology and sci-
ence in modernity and post-modernity.11 And, in SHOT’s NSF Workshop,
Carroll Pursell particularly insisted on the virtues of cultural history as ap-
plied to technology, though in a much broader sense.12
5. This was the argument of my “Tilting at Paper Tigers,” British Journal for the His-
tory of Science 26 (1993): 67–75.
6. “The idea seems to be that if our findings or our arguments fit neatly into some
widely accepted theoretical framework, then that will satisfy all the conceivable method-
ological concerns: theory provides that common language of argument . . . and it also
provides as much social science as we might need to ensure that our statements are
anchored in a plausible understanding of human nature and social being.” Peter Mand-
ler, “The Problem with Cultural History,” Cultural and Social History 1 (2004): 94–117.
7. See the reviews of John Law, Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technosci-
ence (Durham, 2002), by Eric Schatzberg, “On Attempting to Construct Alternative
Narratives,” in Technology and Culture 45 (2004): 406–12, and by David Edgerton in
Metascience 12 (2003): 85–87.
8. See for example the “Focus: Thick Things” section of Isis 98 (2007), and Bill
Brown, ed., Things (Chicago, 2004).
9. Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds.,Does Technology Drive History? The Dilem-
ma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). See my review in British
Journal for the History of Science 28 (1995): 370–72.
10. Mikael Hård and Andrew Jamison, Hubris and Hybrids: A Cultural History of
Technology and Science (London, 2005).
11. Paul Forman,“The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmod-
ernity, and of Ideology in the History of Technology,”History and Technology 23 (2007):
1–152.
12. Carroll Pursell, “Technologies as Cultural Practice and Production,” Technology
and Culture 51 (2010): 715–22.
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We need to attend to meanings not just in relation to technology but in
the work of historians of technology too. To get at what historians of tech-
nology are actually doing and how they do it, we need to look beyond the
claims to methodological and historiographical novelty, implicit and ex-
plicit, and attend to what is said and done. Yet in the history of technology,
analysis of what historians have argued, produced, established, assumed,
and concluded is extraordinarily rare, whether in celebratory or critical
mode. In SHOT meetings and in the journals, it is surprising how few and
far between critical references to specific historical arguments are: there is
hardly any debate or even serious substantive disagreement.13 Even more
telling is the fact that SHOT’s NSF Workshop, which was designed to pro-
duce reflections on what had been done, generally did not.
In what follows I make a particular assessment and critique of what is
commonly done and made and how it is commonly done and made (to
echo an old and yet, as we shall see, hardly ever observed definition of tech-
nology) in the historiography of technology.14 I suggest that much history
of technology has been concerned with illustrations, through historical
examples, of the nature of technological change. This is done by studying
selected novelties, when they were new, in historically familiar surround-
ings, with the aim of illuminating the technology-society relation. “Tech-
nology” in academic historical practice means a peculiar conflation of nov-
elty and power.15 It is indeed a hazardous term, to use Leo Marx’s term,
which often seems to blunt analytical tools; sometimes it seems to make
critical thought impossible.16 As recent work by Eric Schatzberg makes
clear, the term “technology” is a much-changing, fluid concept; its wide-
spread use in something like the modern sense dates only from the inter-
war years, and though it was closely connected to the idea of progress it was
not then conflated with novelty.17 It became identified with technological
13. There are partial exceptions—for example, the exchange between Ken Alder and
Charles Gillispie in Technology and Culture 39 (1998): 733–54; Leo Marx’s review of
Stephen H. Cutcliffe and Robert C. Post, eds., In Context: History and the History of Tech-
nology—Essays in Honor of Melvin Kranzberg (Bethlehem, Pa., 1989), in Technology and
Culture 32 (1991): 394–96; and “Comment and Response on the Review of In Context,”
in Technology and Culture 33 (1992): 406–7.
14. Charles Singer et al., eds., A History of Technology (London, 1955), 1:vii.
15. I have also argued there is an analogous problem in the history of twentieth-cen-
tury science, which is focused on research, not science, and within that on academic
research in subfields of physics and biology, while claiming to be engaged with questions
of “science and society” rather than merely the history of the academy. See my “‘The
Linear Model’ Did Not Exist” (n. 4 above).
16. Leo Marx,“Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept,”Social Research
64 (1997): 965–88.A revised version, which I have not seen, is Leo Marx,“Technology: The
Emergence of a Hazardous Concept,” Technology and Culture 51 (2010): 561–77.
17. Eric Schatzberg,“Technik Comes to America: Changing Meanings of Technology
before 1930,” Technology and Culture 47 (2006): 486–512; Ruth Oldenziel, Making Tech-
nology Masculine: Men, Women and Modern Machines in America, 1870–1945 (Amster-
dam, 1999).
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novelty after World War II, and this identification, I argue, has profoundly
affected historical work.18 In other words, the history of technology uses
very particular definitions of technology and history, definitions that
would need replacing should one want to inquire into the place of technol-
ogy in history, to answer questions like, “What technologies shaped twenti-
eth-century America?” or better still, “Was Tom Hughes right about tech-
nology in American history?”
My assessment is a particular and limited one, concerned mainly (but
certainly not only) with outstanding general texts in the history of technol-
ogy, concentrating on what they say about the twentieth century.19 The
field is fortunate that some of its very best practitioners have self-con-
sciously brought together the scholarly journal and book output of the last
few decades in general texts for students and the public.20 By studying these
18. David Edgerton,“De l’innovation aux usages: Dix thèses éclectiques sur l’histoire
des techniques,” Annales HSS iv–v (1998): 815–37 (the English version is “From Inno-
vation to Use: Ten [Eclectic] Theses on the History of Technology,”History and Technol-
ogy 16 [1999]: 1–26).
19. I would insist that many of my observations do not apply to the study of earlier
periods, particularly the early modern (the historiography of which is addressed by
Pamela Long in an essay from this same workshop that follows on pages 698–714). For
an important and original big-picture work notable for bringing together science, tech-
nology, and medicine, and for distinguishing between types of each, see John V. Pick-
stone, Ways of Knowing: A New History of Science, Technology, and Medicine (Chicago,
2001). I do not deal with it here because it is focused on periods before the twentieth cen-
tury, and because technology is not its main concern.
20. I note here the following, in chronological order, though I do not discuss them
all. Some I have discussed in my “De l’innovation aux usages.” Arnold Pacey, The Maze
of Ingenuity: Ideas and Idealism in the Development of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.,
1992; first edition, London, 1974); Thomas P. Hughes,American Genesis: A Century of In-
vention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870–1970 (New York, 1989); Arnold Pacey, Tech-
nology in World Civilisation: A Thousand Year History (Oxford, 1990); R. A. Buchanan,
The Power of the Machine: The Impact of Technology from 1700 to the Present (London,
1992); Donald Cardwell, Fontana History of Technology (London, 1994), known in the
United States as the Norton History of Technology and more recently as Wheels, Clocks,
and Rockets: A History of Technology; Carroll Pursell, White Heat: People and Technology
(Berkeley, Calif., 1994); Carroll Pursell,The Machine in America: A Social History of Tech-
nology (Baltimore, 1995); Carroll Pursell, Technology in Postwar America: A History (New
York, 2007); Ruth Schwartz Cowan, A Social History of American Technology (New York,
1997); Thomas P. Hughes,Human-Built World: How to Think about Technology and Cul-
ture (Chicago, 2004); Thomas J. Misa, From Leonardo to the Internet: Technology and
Culture from the Renaissance to the Present (Baltimore, 2004); Hård and Jamison (n. 10
above); David Nye,Technology Matters: Questions to LiveWith (Cambridge, Mass., 2006);
Robert Friedel,A Culture of Improvement: Technology and theWestern Millennium (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2007). For younger readers there is also W. Bernard Carlson, ed., Technol-
ogy inWorld History (New York, 2005). See also Dick van Lente, “Three Overviews of the
History of Technology,” History and Technology 24 (2008): 89–96, which deals with
Leonardo to the Internet, with Hubris and Hybrids (n. 10 above), and with Harry Lintsen,
Made in Holland: Een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland (1800–2000) (Zutphen, Neth-
erlands, 2005), which alas I cannot read.
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rich fruits we shall know the field, its implicit and explicit assumptions. I
show that key assumptions about technology and history to be found in
this literature are also commonplaces in many different historical and
social scientific literatures, in the best and most celebrated works.
It might be objected that such general texts in their very generality cut
against the grain of recent developments, and that they therefore cannot
stand for the field as a whole. Whether there is in fact a great difference be-
tween the explicit big pictures and the implicit ones in local studies is
something to be established, not assumed. My own view is that, for all the
supposed incredulity toward meta-narratives, there is a usually implicit
credulity toward some meta-narratives in narrower studies, usually the
familiar long-established ones though often inverted into anti-progressive
forms. But in this essay I make no attempt to assess the journal literature.
I should say something about my own contribution to the big-picture
genre.The Shock of the Oldwas written for the general reader, so I did not set
out a full critique of the literature or label every novelty. This has led
inevitably to both expected and unexpected misunderstandings of its argu-
ment and aims. The book was based on the idea (developed here) that
accounts of the material constitution of twentieth-century society have been
flimsy, yet had very great authority; that theories of material modernity have
stood in for empirical studies; and that echoes of past boosterism shaped
historiographical agendas. The Shock of the Old seeks to present new histor-
ical arguments in relation to technology in history, about such matters as
production, nations and nationalism, war, and so on. It rests on a very gen-
eral historiographical critique, rather than on a call to shift attention to
under-researched aspects of technology. Although it has been interpreted as
arguing for the study of use over invention/innovation, or for the small
rather than the big, or for extending studies of users and consumers, or to
shift attention from the rich to the poor, it is a call to rethink invention/
innovation as well as use—to rethink the big as well as the small, production
as well as consumption, and the rich world as well as the poor world.21
21. The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (New York, 2007).
Furthermore, I had set out some of my general argument in relation to the existing lit-
erature in my “De l’innovation aux usages.” I have added some reflections and elabora-
tions on particular aspects in two papers derived from particular chapters in “Creole
Technologies and Global Histories: Rethinking How Things Travel in Space and Time,”
HOST: Journal of the History of Science and Technology 1, no. 1 (2007): 75–112, available
at http://www.johost.eu/user/data/media/hostn1v1-a2.pdf (accessed 12 May 2010), and
“The Contradictions of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A Historical Per-
spective,” New Global Studies 1, no. 1 (2007): article 1, available at http://www.bepress.
com/ngs/vol1/iss1/art1 (accessed 12 May 2010).
07_51.3edgerton 680–97:03_49.3dobraszczyk 568–  7/14/10  3:59 PM  Page 685
T E C H N O L O G Y A N D C U L T U R E
JULY
2010
VOL. 51
686
What Is the History of Technology About?
Reviewing the T. K. Derry and Trevor Williams Short History of Technol-
ogy, the 1961 condensation of the multivolume History of Technology pub-
lished by Oxford University Press, Thomas P. Hughes lamented that “influ-
enced by prior scholarship they have generally written of the history of
technology as if it were identical with the history of invention” despite their
very broad and noninnovation-centric definition of technology, alluded to
above.22 Hughes’s complaint notwithstanding, the identification of tech-
nology not with invention, but with some successful invention and the early
histories of particular technologies, lives on powerfully, and is especially
evident in (though certainly not restricted to) general texts.
Let us move from the past observations from the last of the founders to
the newest general text, Robert Friedel’s Culture of Improvement. Friedel’s
introduction tells us that the subject matter is the “nature of technological
change,” why and how technological change has changed, and how the
changes have changed. It promises to be a history of invention and innova-
tion, usefully recast as part of a wider history of “improvement,” avoiding
the misleading and almost always post-hoc distinctions between radical
and incremental inventions, which are still very prominent in the literature.
For Friedel, improvements can be small or large and apply to all technolo-
gies, whether old or new, an important analytical advance. Yet the book
presents a familiar account of selected technologies at early points in their
history. Agriculture thus appears in a chapter on the medieval heavy plow,
the horse, and three-course rotation and again in the nineteenth century
with mechanization and artificial fertilizers. The greatest-ever age of agri-
cultural improvement in the rich world, that of the late twentieth century,
is not discussed. The subjects of the four chapters on the twentieth century
are the early histories of strategic bombing, the nuclear bomb, dams and
electrification, computers, the internet, jets and supersonic airliners, eugen-
ics, television, and radio, with bicycles making a welcome appearance to
provide some contrast.
Friedel’s choice of technologies, and the focus on their early history, are
perfectly representative of the field. For example, in Tom Misa’s From Leon-
ardo to the Internet, the period 1870–1930 is discussed in terms of research
and invention in electricity and chemicals; 1936–90 in terms of the wartime
(World War II, that is) history of the atomic bomb, electronics, and com-
puting; and 1970–2001 in terms of the fax, hamburgers, and the internet.
The period 1900–50 is also dealt with in terms of modern architecture, but
otherwise, apart from the hamburger, the technologies and their periodiza-
tions are very familiar. A variant is given in Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s textbook
on U.S. technology which claims explicitly that “four technological systems
22. Thomas P. Hughes, review of T. K. Derry and Trevor I.Williams,A Short History of
Technology: From the Earliest Times to A.D. 1900 (London, 1961), in Isis 54 (1963): 417–18.
07_51.3edgerton 680–97:03_49.3dobraszczyk 568–  7/14/10  3:59 PM  Page 686
NSF ESSAY
SERIES
EDGERTONK|KWhat Is the Historiography of Technology About?
687
have dominated twentieth-century history: automobiles, and their atten-
dant roads and fuel sources; aircraft, spacecraft and also rockets; electronic
communication devices, from wireless telegraphy to personal computers;
and finally, biotechnologies, new foodstuffs, medications, and contracep-
tives,” an argument which has the virtue of insisting on the simultaneous
existence of these systems.23
Even when there is an explicit concern to engage with general history,
the familiar technologies in their early years are center-stage. Thomas
Hughes’s American Genesis is focused on the early history of electricity,
research and development, mass production, and the atomic bomb. More
recently a general American history textbook written by Pauline Maier,
Merritt Roe Smith, Alexander Keyssar, and Daniel J. Kevles includes much
material on science, technology, and medicine and deals with the usual sus-
pects in the usual period—for example, the atom bomb in World War II.24
For all that they concentrate on the early history of a small sample of
technologies, such studies are not histories of invention or innovation. They
are not concerned with the analysis of invention and innovation in particu-
lar historical periods. Were they to do so they would be largely histories of
failure, and they would be much more broad-ranging in the technologies
covered.25 What we have in these texts is a conflation of stories of invention/
innovation and of use. There is a focus on the early history of selected tech-
nologies which later came into widespread use, or which appear self-evi-
dently important. They are neither a history of technologies in use at a par-
ticular time, nor yet a history of invention or innovation at that time. It is
the conflation, not the focus on invention or innovation, which is a crucial
problem with the literature if one is interested in the place of technology in
history, or indeed the history of invention or innovation.26
There are, however, many significant general works which are less inno-
vation-centric than the norm: they include the works of Arnold Pacey,
especially Maze of Ingenuity, and Carroll Pursell, especially White Heat and
Technology in Postwar America. There are many studies of technologies in
use, particularly but not only by historians concerned with gender and the
domestic: think of Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s More Work for Mother.27 In the
23. Cowan, A Social History of American Technology, 221.
24. Pauline Maier, Merritt Roe Smith, Alexander Keyssar, and Daniel J. Kevles, In-
venting America: A History of the United States (New York, 2003), 2 vols.
25. For clear evidence on this see Ian Inkster, “Patents as Indicators of Technological
Change and Innovation—an Historical Analysis of the Patent Data,” Transactions of the
Newcomen Society 73 (2003): 179–208.
26. It is for this reason that I have argued in The Shock of the Old not, as is sometimes
suggested, for studies of use rather than invention, but rather for properly specified stud-
ies of each. I did not explain clearly enough in “Innovation to Use” that innovation-cen-
tric studies were not typically studies of innovation or invention as such. In either case,
the originality of the point resides not in the point itself—which is obvious—but in not-
ing the systematic way the literature conflates innovation and use.
27. Among the histories to be noted are Ruth Schwartz Cowan,MoreWork for Moth-
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er: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New
York, 1983); Claude Fischer, America Calling: A Social History of the Telephone to 1940
(Berkeley, Calif., 1992); K. Jellison, Entitled to Power: Farm Women and American Tech-
nology (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993); Ronald Kline, Consumers in the Country: Technology
and Social Change in Rural America (Baltimore, 2000); and Andrea Tone, Devices and
Desires: A History of Contraceptives in America (New York, 2001). An excellent recent ex-
ample is Kenneth Lipartito and Orville R. Butler, History of the Kennedy Space Center
(Gainesville, Fla., 2007). Note must be taken of works on technology focused on use by
those who were not primarily historians: Siegfried Giedion, Mechanization Takes Com-
mand: A Contribution to Anonymous History (New York, 1948); Cynthia Cockburn and
Susan Ormrod, Gender and Technology in the Making (London, 1993); Stewart Brand,
How Buildings Learn: What Happens After They’re Built (New York, 1994); Vaclav Smil,
Energy in World History (Boulder, Colo., 1994); Arnulf Grübler, Technology and Global
Change (Cambridge, 1998).
28. Paul Josephson, Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transfor-
mation of the Natural World (Washington, D.C., 2002); John McNeill, Something New
Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century (London, 2000).
29. Svante Lindqvist, “Changes in the Technological Landscape: The Temporal Di-
mension in the Growth and Decline of Large Technological Systems,” in O. Granstrand,
ed., Economics of Technology (Amsterdam, 1994), 271–88.
30. Carroll Pursell, “Seeing the Invisible: New Perceptions in the History of
Technology,” ICON 1 (1995): 9–15.
31. This is a criticism made by Langdon Winner, who had long been concerned with
use, in “Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and
the Philosophy of Technology,” Science, Technology & Human Values 18 (1993): 362–78.
32. Ruth Schwartz Cowan, “The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research
Strategies in the Sociology of Technology,” in Wiebe E. Bijker et al., eds., The Social Con-
struction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technol-
ogy (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 261–80; Ruth Oldenziel, “Man the Maker, Woman the
environmental case note should be taken of Paul Josephson’s work on
“brute force technologies.”28 Important as the exceptions are, exceptions to
the rule are not the same as critiques, nor do they necessarily even betoken
awareness of the problem of innovation-centric conflation. In this light it is
important to recall Svante Lindqvist’s unjustly neglected article on map-
ping technological landscapes, which notes the focus on early history and
the lack of studies of both use and, most interestingly, disappearance.29 Pur-
sell has argued that “the history of technology, as currently studied, privi-
leges design over use, production over consumption and periods of
‘change’ over those which seem static and traditional.”30 But neither of
these crucial articles addressed the central conflation I am focusing on.
However, the move among some historians of technology to studying
users and consumption does not necessarily mean a move to the study of
technologies-in-use. Studies of users, central to work in the SCOT tradi-
tion, focus on users in innovation. Indeed an innovation-centric definition
of technology is central to SCOT.31 In Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s call for the
study of the “consumption junction,” and in Ruth Oldenziel’s subsequent
arguments, a central point made is that studying users shows them active in
the shaping of technology.32 It is revealing, too, that the key concept of tech-
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Consumer: The Consumption Junction Revisited,” in Feminism in the Twentieth Century:
Science, Technology, and Medicine, ed. Londa Schiebinger et al. (Chicago, 2001); Trevor
Pinch and Nelly Oudshoorn, eds., How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and
Technologies (Cambridge, Mass., 2003). See also “Presidential Symposium,” Enterprise &
Society 7, no. 3 (2006): 422–55 (Joanne Yates).
33. See Edgerton, “De l’innovation aux usages” (n. 18 above).
34. John R. McNeill and William H. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird’s-Eye View of
Global History (New York, 2003).
35. See Pamela Long’s essay, which follows in this issue of T&C on pp. 698–714; see
also the comments on this topic by Serafina Cuomo in Technology and Culture in Greek
and Roman Antiquity (Cambridge, 2007); by Kevin Greene in “Archaeology and Technol-
ogy,” in Blackwell Companion to Archaeology, ed. J. Bintliff (Oxford, 2004), 155–73; and
by Kevin Greene in “Technological Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient
World: M. I. Finley Re-considered,” Economic History Review 53 (2000): 29–59.
36. Thus Pierre Lemonnier notes of his own collection of essays that “most papers
are concerned [not with invention but] with a subsequent step of the process of innova-
tion, that of ‘choosing’ what to do with a new technical element, whether it has been con-
trived locally or not” (Lemonnier, ed., Technological Choices: Transformation in Material
Cultures since the Neolithic [London, 1993], 21). See also Francesca Bray, Technology and
Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, Calif., 1997), and Robert McC.
Adams, Paths of Fire: An Anthropologist’s Inquiry intoWestern Technology (Princeton, N.J.,
1997), for different sorts of arguments about different places.
37. Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, vol 1: The
Rise of the Network Society (Oxford, 1996). It was this and similar studies I was attacking
(while protecting the identity of the guilty), particularly in the “Production” chapter of
The Shock of the Old (n. 21 above): the idea that we have now moved into a dematerial-
ized, information age.
38. David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial
nological determinism has been routinely defined as something along the
lines of “technical change causing social change” rather than in terms of
technology shaping society—the old, standard definition. It is also signifi-
cant that it is criticized as a theory of technology, rather than what it clas-
sically was: a theory of society and history.33
The innovation-centric conflation of innovation and use in the case of
technology is something that the history of technology shares with a very
broad scholarly community. It appears as a problem even where one might
least expect it. If one looks at the work of general historians at the macro
level, the innovation-centric focus is strongly evident.34 It is there in stud-
ies of technology in the ancient through to the early-modern periods,
where data on invention are scarce to say the least.35 It is present in anthro-
pology too, though of course so are, as one would expect, studies of use.36
Sociology is replete with naive innovation-centrism, evident, for example,
in the work of Manuel Castells.37 For economics and economic history, the
import of the distinction between invention/innovation, diffusion, and im-
pact is so well-known as to be obvious. Yet in economic history the domi-
nant tradition of thinking about technology has been Schumpeterian in
inclination, and thus very innovation-centric, as is evident in the work of
David Landes and Joel Mokyr.38
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Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge, 1969); Joel Mokyr,
The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (New York, 1990); Joel
Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton, N.J.,
2002). As examples of innovation-centric and very limited treatments of technology in
economic history, see Barry Eichengreen,The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated
Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton, N.J., 2006).
39. See G. N. von Tunzelmann, Steam Power and British Industrialization to 1860
(Oxford, 1978); D. N. McCloskey, Econometric History (London, 1987); and Paul David,
“Computer and Dynamo: The Modern Productivity Paradox in a Not-Too-Distant
Mirror,” Center for Economic Policy Research, No. 172, Stanford University, July 1989
(also available in other versions).
40. William D. Nordhaus, “Traditional Productivity Estimates Are Asleep at the
(Technological) Switch,” Economic Journal 107 (1997): 1548–59, gives a new price index
for lighting, but one which appears to take the moment of innovation as changing the
overall price! For the full treatment see William D. Nordhaus, “Do Real Output and Real
Wage Measures Capture Reality? The History of Lighting Suggests Not,” in The Econo-
mics of New Goods, ed. Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert J. Gordon (Chicago, 1997), 29–
70. William D. Nordhaus, “Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing,” Jour-
nal of Economic History 67 (2007): 128–59, repeats the same procedure—it deals with the
frontier, assuming instantaneous diffusion.
41. A recent example: Richard G. Lipsey, Kenneth I. Carlaw, and Clifford T. Baker,
Economic Transformations: General Purpose Technologies and Long Term Economic Growth
(Oxford, 2005). See my remarks in chapter 1 of The Shock of the Old, and especially Alex-
ander J. Field, “Does Economic History Need GPTs?” (working paper, September 2008),
electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/ (accessed 14 June 2010). His answer is an
emphatic no, noting among many other things that many supposed examples of GPTs do
not conform to the usual definitions, and in any case the assumption that something like
GPTs are in principle likely to have the greatest impact does not hold. In addition he
makes many criticisms of particular studies.
42. Chris Freeman and Francisco Louçã, As Time Goes By: From the Industrial
Revolutions to the Information Revolution (Oxford, 2002). In Hubris and Hybrids (n. 10
above), Hård and Jamison take them up explicitly in their cultural history and relate each
wave to cultural reactions to technoscience (p. 56).
The focus on use is clear in the tradition of cliometric history—in the
work of Paul David, for example—but it is far from general.39 The eco-
nomics of technology is mostly the economics of innovation; influential
and well-known work conflates the two, for example William Nordhaus’s
work on the impact of technology on productivity in the long run.40 The
issue is not just one of timing of impacts, but also of which technologies are
significant. Even when these issues are explicitly considered (as in studies of
the use and impact of “general purpose technologies”), they are the usual
suspects (steam, electricity, and information technology) in the usually as-
sociated periods.41 We might note, too, the extreme innovation-centricity
and reification of the usual suspects in the so-called “long-wave” theories,
in vogue from the late 1970s into the 1980s.42
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43. Hughes, review of T. K. Derry and Trevor I. Williams (n. 22 above).
44. Hughes has, after all, written American Genesis (n. 20 above). For Gabrielle
Hecht, “The history of the [early] French nuclear program is . . . both a history of tech-
nology and a history of France” (The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National
Identity after World War II [Cambridge, Mass., 1998], 4).
45. Misa (n. 20 above), xiv; the term also provides the title for the final chapter. My
assessment differs somewhat from that of Eda Kranakis, who hailed the book in that “it
puts technology back into mainstream history” (Technology and Culture 46 [2005]: 812),
a comment which suggests previous attempts had not succeeded!
46. And so too in many ways isHubris and Hybrids a work which usefully decries the
“romance and tragedy” styles of discussing technoscience. Note also that the tone of all
these works is very different from the standard history book, either for the academy or
the general public.
47. In particular the contribution of Rebecca Herzig, but also the roundtable of da
Vinci Medalists. To be clear: I am far from arguing against such an engagement, but there
The Question of History
In his review of Derry and Williams, Hughes lamented their failure to
integrate the history of technology into history, despite their claim to have
done this.43 The focus on history, of placing technology within its histori-
cal context, has been central to U.S. history of technology for decades—evi-
dent, for example, in the work of Hughes and his students, and in the
American Historical Association/SHOT booklet series.44 Yet it is worth not-
ing that despite this commitment among many of its American founders
and long-time supporters, the so-called Society for the History of Technol-
ogy does not put history first in its constitution: “The purpose of the
Society shall be to foster interest in the development of technology and its
relations with society and culture, and to promote scholarly study of the
documents and artifacts of the history of technology.” In this the constitu-
tion was prescient, or perhaps prescriptive, in that most SHOT conference
sessions are organized by technology and theme, not historical period, nor
historical question (though of course some are).
That historical questions are often secondary is reflected in the fact that
the explicit aim of key books by SHOT figures is to say something about
what Thomas Misa calls, after Martin Heidegger, “the question of technol-
ogy.”45 Friedel’s book is concerned with “technological change,” and the
reader is invited to think of the “moral” questions around technology.
Hughes’s Human-Built World: How to Think about Technology and Culture
and David Nye’s Technology Matters: Questions to Live With are concerned
explicitly with the nature of technology and its relations to wider culture,
not with history, as the titles indicate.46 Though more historical, the con-
cern with the question of technology is also unmistakable in Pursell’s recent
Technology in Postwar America and in Hård and Jamison’s Hubris and Hy-
brids. Indeed, it was striking, at least to me, how much of the discussion in
the SHOT plenaries in Washington in 2007 was directly concerned with
moral questions and political engagement rather than with history.47
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is a difference between engagement in a political/moral question through an engagement
in a historical debate, and a direct engagement with politics. At least that is my experi-
ence of doing both.
48. At the NSF Workshop a participant criticized my optimistic view of the public
sphere, stressing the lack of civic solidarity across age, gender, etc., and the consequent
self-isolation which left people vulnerable to insidiously propagandistic notions. All I
can say from my experience of the reception granted The Shock of the Old (n. 21 above)
is that there is a public, of all ages and genders, for grown-up accounts of technology in
history.
49. For examples see my Warfare State: Britain 1920–1970 (Cambridge, 2005), and
The Shock of the Old. Raphael Samuel was a pioneer not just of “history from below” but
of “historiography from below” in his generous recovery of the contributions of indus-
Of course addressing “the question of technology” is laudable and re-
flects the many and varied publics with which the history of technology en-
gages. In terms of academic audiences, historians of technology address
non-historians primarily, above all engineering and science students, and,
among researchers, the external audience is most likely to be social scien-
tists interested in technology. The wider public interested in the history of
technology is also primarily interested in technology rather than history;
the policy concerns of historians of technology tend to be in the area of
technology policy. This is as it should be, yet historians of technology and
their publics exist in a state of tension, which shapes the work of historians
in direct ways.
Historiography from Below
Historians of technology have stressed fundamental differences in the
way they understand technology from the way they believe their publics
understand technology. In particular, the historians emphasize their free-
dom from what they consider common public delusions, among them
technological determinism, the linear model, and whig history. However,
there is much that is common to both once we look seriously at non-aca-
demic and non-professional literatures. We should take non-professional
historical ideas seriously not merely as objects of study, but also as contri-
butions to our shared understanding of technology in history. What I call
doing historiography from below shows vast stores of accumulated knowl-
edge which can be used by academic historians, as well as reminding us that
popular understanding of technology in history is much more sophisti-
cated than is often assumed.48 It is a powerful way, particularly if this
knowledge is studied in time, of uncovering and understanding core as-
sumptions in academic studies, particularly those that endure over long
periods. For example, it helps make visible key assumptions which under-
lie most academic accounts of the relations of science, technology, eco-
nomics, and twentieth-century war, and indeed many other aspects of
thinking about science and technology over the last century.49
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trial archaeologists and others to our historical understanding. The term is mine. See in
particular Samuel’s “Unofficial Knowledge,” in Theatres of Memory: Past and Present in
Contemporary Culture (London, 1994).
50. For a recent very interesting statement of the significance of this work, see Hård
and Jamison (n. 10 above), 8.
51. Harry Elmer Barnes, Historical Sociology: Its Origins and Development: Theories
of Social Evolution from Cave Life to Atomic Bombing (New York, 1948), 145.
52. I owe this point to Gareth Stedman Jones.
53. Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (London, 1968), 605.
54. Samuel Lilley, Men, Machines, and History: The Story of Tools and Machines in
Relation to Social Progress, 2nd ed. (London, 1965).
Looking at non-professional accounts of technology in society and his-
tory can help us understand the depth of the commitment to the standard
account of twentieth-century technology. In his 1934 text Technics and Civ-
ilization, Lewis Mumford celebrated the neotechnic revolution (the term
was coined by Patrick Geddes, but rendered into English, new technology
makes its meaning and significance clearer) being brought about by elec-
tricity and new alloys.50 Mumford was not the first or the last to think in
this way. For example, Harry Elmer Barnes, a noted U.S. historical sociolo-
gist and exponent of the “technological conception of history,” thought in
1948 that the world had gone through three industrial revolutions, the first
of iron, steam, and textiles, the second of chemistry and large industries,
steel, and new communications, and the third, still occurring in 1948, was
“the age of electrification, automatic machinery, electric control over man-
ufacturing processes, air transport, radios and so on.” A fourth was on the
way: “with the coming of intra-atomic energy and supersonic stratospheric
aviation we face an even more staggering fourth Industrial Revolution.”51
Barnes was known at this time for his “revisionist” views on the United
States and the world wars, and he would become a pioneering Holocaust
denier; his views on technology were orthodox commonplaces.
The Left too thought in these terms. Marxism had long focused on what
bourgeois propagandists took to be the most radical and novel forms of
industrial organization.52 It was to be an enduring feature of Marxist
thought. The Belgian Trotskyite economist Ernest Mandel, writing in the
early 1960s, claimed the first industrial revolution had been based on the
steam engine, the second on the electric motor and the internal combustion
engine, and the third, of which the “warning signs” appeared in the 1940s,
was based on nuclear energy and electronically controlled automation.53 A
British communist writing in the mid-1960s, and one who believed in only
one industrial revolution, treated the period since World War II in terms of
atomic power, computers, automation, and space exploration.54 In the
Soviet Union the idea of a “Scientific-Technical Revolution,” centered on
automation, became Communist Party doctrine from the mid-1960s. The
idea may well have been lifted from the earlier bourgeois idea of the “Scien-
tific Revolution” (as in C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revo-
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55. See for example Waqar Zaidi, “‘Aviation Will Either Destroy or Save Our Civiliza-
tion’: Proposals for the Internationalisation of Aviation, 1920–1945,” Journal of Contem-
porary History (forthcoming, 2010).
56. For an exception see Leo Marx’s review of Cutcliffe and Post, and the responses
thereto (n. 13 above).
57. Andy Pickering, “The Rad Lab and the World,” British Journal for the History of
Science 25 (1992): 251. Latour is of course right to warn against the use of context (given
by existing social science or history) to explain other knowledge. We shouldn’t explain
lution) applied not to the seventeenth century but to the twentieth, and as-
sociated with airplanes, electronics, and atomic power.
The similarity of the short lists of technologies, along with the closeness
of the point of innovation to the period of their supposed world-historical
significance, add up to a striking consensus across political, ideological, and
national boundaries. Also notable is the lack of empirical justification for
the centrality of this or that technology to this or that historical period. We
need to understand the content of such claims not merely for historical but
also for historiographical reasons: such accounts remain profoundly influ-
ential in shaping our historical understanding.55
Contextual Histories
The aim of many historical studies of technology in the SHOT tradition
has been to think about technology by placing it in its historical and cul-
tural context.What that context is or should be has not provoked much dis-
cussion, perhaps necessarily so.56 An obvious limitation is that historians
do not agree about history. There is a more significant flaw in contextual-
ism in that it assumes that the existing historical work used to establish
context does not already have a particular account of technology in it. But
it generally does, at least implicitly, resulting in a range of possibilities from
contradiction to circularity. Circularity is more likely, in that general his-
torical accounts have implicit accounts focused on the usual technological
suspects in the usual periods.
One way out of these problems might be to write the “history of con-
tent and context together,” by emphasizing “co-production,” a program
strongly influenced by the work of Bruno Latour and his critique of social
construction. Andy Pickering puts the case powerfully for science, but the
argument applies equally to technology: he calls for work “without regard
for traditional distinctions between history of science and history more
generally, and especially without centering research upon an archive
demarcated by such distinctions.” Pickering continues: “Such an approach
would blur the disciplinary identity of historians of science, of course, but
no one is better placed than historians of science to speak of the truly inte-
gral place of science in global history, and the end result might be a clearer
view of global history itself.”57 But in this kind of post-contextual history,
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(say) technology through sociology; fine, but Latour often confounds sociology with
society. In order to understand society, and how it relates to technology, we need to
understand sociology and criticize it in connection with empirical materials.
58. Hecht’s The Radiance of France (n. 44 above) is a very good example of this post-
contextualist approach, as is Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics,
Modernity (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), chap. 1, “Can the Mosquito Speak?”This chapter deals
with DDT, Aswan Dams, and synthetic nitrate fertilizer in a very well-realized Latourian
way of writing about the co-production of new material and technical forms, though the
latter are high-profile imports into Egypt.
59. An important and honorable exception is Pacey, Technology inWorld Civilisation
(n. 20 above), which has a fair amount on poor countries in the twentieth century. Peter
Worsley,The ThreeWorlds: Culture andWorld Development (London, 1984), is a rare case
of a comprehensive account.
60. Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India
(Princeton, N.J., 1999), 3.
61. See, for example, the papers covering the twentieth century in Morris Low, ed.,
“Beyond Joseph Needham: Science, Technology, and Medicine in East and South East
Asia,” special issue of Osiris, 2nd ser., 13 (1998); Roy MacLeod and Deepak Kumar, eds.,
Technology and the Raj: Western Technology and Technical Transfers to India, 1700–1947
(New Delhi, 1995); David Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India
(Cambridge, 2000); and, to a considerable extent, Mitchell.
there is always the Latourian temptation of seeing the world as being re-
created from scratch in the laboratory, and of depicting it as described by
scientists and engineers, without noting that their images are far from
being original to them.58
A different kind of post-contextual history is possible. Let me give a con-
crete instance of how this might work. Let us imagine that we had a full ac-
count of global twentieth-century invention, innovation, and technologies-
in-use, derived independently from contemporary commentary and our
histories. Could we usefully contextualize this within existing global histo-
ries? I think this answer is no. An account of the material constitution of the
human race in the twentieth century would stand as a rebuke to our under-
standing of the historical context; it would also stand as a rebuke to most the-
orizing on modernity. For example, it would reveal the rise of a new poor
world, which hardly figures in global histories or theories of modernity.59
This is not so much as a result of lack of interest in the poor world, rather
that of seeing it as a deficient, behind-the-times version of the central model.
Indeed the astonishing power of the standard picture of twentieth-cen-
tury technology is demonstrated by its centrality to studies of the colonial
and post-colonial worlds. Thus Gyan Prakash notes that to “speak of India
is to call attention to the structures in which the lives of its people are en-
meshed—railroads, steel plants, mining, irrigation, hydro-electric projects
. . . and now, the bomb.”60 The long list he produces hardly includes any-
thing which did not come from outside India and was not central to West-
ern accounts of modernity. Most studies of India and of colonial and post-
colonial settings deal with just such machines and structures.61 The same
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62. See the special issue of Social Studies of Science from 2002, and one with the same
title in Science as Culture in 2005, both of which contain studies dealing with the recent
past in Tibet, Australia, Peru, Brazil, Mexico, French Africa, and French Guyana, mostly
not post-colonial cases. The examples of “technoscience,”with maybe two exceptions, are
the reassuringly familiar “Western” bioscience and medicine, uranium mining, rockets,
and computers. This is no aberration: at the SHOT meeting in Lisbon in 2008, I estimate
there were fifteen papers on poor countries in the twentieth century (excluding former
socialist countries). Three dealt with nuclear issues, three with computers or IT, two with
television, and there were single papers on mobile phones, rockets, airplanes, the green
revolution, engineers, and two unspecified. This is not wholly typical because in previ-
ous years dams have been prominent, but even then the point is made.
63. Francesca Bray, “Technics and Civilisation in Late Imperial China: An Essay in
the Cultural History of Technology,” in Low, 11–33.
64. This is the argument of The Shock of the Old (n. 21 above). See also my “Creole
Technologies and Global Histories” (n. 21 above), and David Arnold, “Europe, Technol-
ogy and Colonialism,”History and Technology 21 (2005): 85–106.
65. Rosalind Williams,“Opening the Big Box,”Technology and Culture 48 (2007): 104.
66. See the wonderful critique of the military-historical literature, and the way it
deals with technology, by George Raudzens in “War-Winning Weapons: The Measure-
ment of Technological Determinism in Military History,” Journal of Military History 54
(1990): 403–34. Raudzens notes that “we have assertions, images and impressions of
technological decisiveness in war, but we have no detailed measurement, analysis or con-
sensus” (p. 432).
applies to the great majority of studies of “post-colonial technoscience.”62
There is nothing subaltern about technologies in post-colonial literature.
This is all the more striking given that a central concern of studies of post-
colonialism is to challenge the view that Western models of modernity ap-
ply to the non-Western world, as Francesca Bray has.63 There is a more gen-
eral challenge to be made than “provincializing Europe”: the problem is not
just the so-called Eurocentricity of our account of technology and global
history, but that our picture of the Eurocenter is of very dubious merit.
Looking at the poor world is a challenge not merely to the universality of
standard models but their applicability anywhere.64
Toward Material Histories
Rosalind Williams has called for a history of technology “whose ulti-
mate goal is understanding how history works.”65 But we are a long way
from it. Technological determinism (the potentially interesting notion that
society is determined by the technology it uses) is at present untestable be-
cause of the weakness of our material explanans by comparison with the
social and historical explanandum. We simply don’t have a picture of, say,
the complete matériel of an army, let alone of a society as a whole.66 Indeed,
appreciating the sheer weakness of our account of the material constitution
of the past and present seems to me to be a critical point. We don’t even
properly understand the large-scale production technologies of the rich
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world. The history of technology-in-use, and the history of invention, too,
have barely begun to be written.
Getting to a better account of technology means counteracting what
Australians usefully call the “cultural cringe”; the term is used as a criticism
of local intellectuals who underrate the cultural production of their local-
ity and overestimate foreign high culture. The very lowness and ubiquity of
technology make it significant in history but suspect in the academy. Yet
there are other unfashionable areas of history, such as business, economic,
and military history, that need to be engaged with rather than going down
the now traditional path of seeking respectability by applying novel high
theory to low subjects. Indeed, we need to reach down the food chain, to
the amateur specialists on plows, tractors, airplanes, rickshaws, aircraft,
small arms, and electric toasters.
Worthwhile historical studies of technology are likely to, and might be
directed to, challenge not what we take to be popular misconceptions, but
rather the best academic work, its substantive content as much as its meth-
odology. Taking seriously how a wide range of scholars treat technology
opens up a powerful site of critique, not least of self-consciously advanced
modes of historical analysis and other analyses, many of which assume very
limited models of the material constitution of society and its development.
Understanding what the founding members of SHOT got wrong (let alone
right) about modernity might well be more significant than finding a new
way of bashing technological determinism, and more interesting than a
ride on the latest novelty in the academic fairground. We should beware of
privileging the novel, in both history and in historiography, not out of con-
servatism, but because we understand the power and influence of claims to
novelty to disguise a lack of novelty, and indeed sometimes to suppress it.
Novelty-mongering is itself profoundly unoriginal, but old-fashioned
futurism, despite being passé, is still surprisingly effective. As the Uruguay-
an engineer (stretching both definitions) the Comte de Lautréamont
quipped a long time ago, progress implies plagiarism; but, we might add,
not all plagiarism is progressive.
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